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Left Out By the Pied Piper: The U.N. Response To 
Children In Localized Conflict Settings 
Mukul Saxena Vimug* 
¶1 Child participation in violent secessionist movements is an on-going problem in 
developing states.1 Ever since the states gained independence from colonial rule, these 
secessionist movements have fought for self-determination on grounds of ethnicity, 
political rivalry, or religious fundamentalism. The United Nations permitted international 
intervention in the civil wars of the 1990s because those conflicts occurred in states 
lacking any semblance of rule of law. In contrast, the current third-world conflicts occur 
within states with a certain level of democratic governance and rule of law, thereby 
limiting international intervention under the auspices of the U.N. Child involvement in 
violent movements presents distinct challenges in terms of how to define those children 
(because there are strong indicators that children voluntarily participate in on-going 
secessionist movements),2 and in terms of the state’s recognition of the child soldier 
problem. Further, the conflicts stemming from secessionist movements present new 
threats to the protection of children.3  
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University of Essex, United Kingdom; Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School, Boston, Mass (2005-06 
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New Delhi.  His other research interests in the field of child rights include the freedom of expression and 
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1 Secessionist movements are active in India within Kashmir and Northeast India, Sri Lanka from the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Pakistan from Balouchistan, and Nepal from the Moaists. 
2 There is a practice of voluntary child recruitment in most secessionist movements. For example, when the 
secessionist movement within Sri Lanka gained momentum between 1987 and 1994 child recruitment was 
largely voluntary or the result of subtle coercion or manipulation. See SONALI, CHILDREN AND CONFLICT: 
CHILD SOLDIERS AND THE ROLE OF SMALL ARMS. Similarly, a great number of children voluntarily 
participated in the political violence in Nepal; Palestine is another example where young people growing up 
in the Occupied Territories are often willing participants in the national struggle and their political 
consciousness is developed to an extent, and from an age, that commonly takes outsiders by surprise. 
JASON HART, CHILDREN’S PARTICIPATION IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION: LEARNING FROM ZONES OF 
CONFLICT (University of Oxford 2004); See also HOGG CHARU LATA, CHILD RECRUITMENT IN SOUTH 
ASIAN CONFLICTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SRI LANKA, NEPAL AND BANGLADESH 12  (The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 2006). 
3 U.N. Children’s Fund & Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict: Children and Conflict in the Changing World: Machel Study 10-Years Strategic Review, 
(April 2009). 




¶2 Child participation in these movements is interwoven with the history of 
decolonization, itself a complex internal struggle of accession and secession between 
newly independent sovereign states and their internal communities. These communities 
felt threatened by what they viewed as an oppressive, dominant regime occupying their 
territory, infringing on their ethnic and tribal identity, and hindering their progress toward 
self-determination. The communities’ collective grievances formed the basis of internal 
struggles, which in turn became protracted armed confrontations with the newly 
established dominant states. These state governments, established as a result of external 
decolonization and the internal choice of the people,4 did not recognize secession as a 
viable means for communities to establish legitimate, democratic states.5  Established 
states believed democratic legitimization of a government contained both the external 
component of decolonization and the internal component of citizens’ right to choose their 
own form of government.6 The right to secede did not fit within this rubric.7  
¶3 Over the last several decades, the legal character of secessionist movements has 
become extremely complex.8 The established states regarded the movements as issues 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Committee, Third Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 1992: India, ¶ 
32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.6 (July 17 1996), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/83d5a36cc444d1d3c125640400501464?Opendocument
[hereinafter State Party Report: India] (“[T]he right to self-determination is said to have both internal and 
external aspects.”). It does appear that so far as external aspects are concerned, the context, background, 
and drafting history, support the view that colonies (and trust territories) were seen as the groups seeking 
autonomy. The international community continues to affirm that the right of external self-determination 
does not extend to component parts or groups within independent sovereign States. If attempts are made to 
promote a thesis favoring the break-up of States on grounds of ethnicity or religion, there would be, as 
cautioned by the United Nations Secretary General in the Agenda for Peace, "No limit to fragmentation and 
peace, security and economic well-being for all would become even more difficult to achieve." U.S. 
Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council 
on 31 January 1992, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992). This was reiterated conclusively and 
unambiguously in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993, which states that the right of self-determination "shall not be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples.” World Conference on Human Rights, 
June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ch. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) 
(Oct. 13, 1993). The Declaration on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations 
reiterates that statement.  
5 State Party Report: India, supra note 4, ¶ 32. Nepal similarly refers to self-determination as the 
immediate granting of this right to the people under the domain of colonialism. See U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, Initial reports of States parties due in 1992: Nepal, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/Add.2 (May 18, 
1994), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/4a5714d7ee86f02d80256759004cd3cc?Opendocumen. 
Sri Lanka also reiterates that the principle of self-determination cannot be construed as authorizing any 
action that would dismember or impair totally or in part the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Third periodic reports of States 
parties due in 1991: Sri Lanka, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/Add.6 (Sept. 27, 1994), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/876c193b2185d4f88025655d003cf33a?Opendocument.  
6 See State Party Report: India, supra note 4, ¶ 32. 
7 Id.  
8 In India, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir has existed since 1989, the situation in the Northeastern 
region since independence in 1947, and the most recent Naxalite problem in the Central region was 
officially recognized by the State in 2003. Similarly, the Maoists problem in Nepal erupted in 1990 after 
the restoration of parliamentary democracy where the Maoists sought establish a Maoist people’s 
democracy. Sri Lanka too was in the middle of such a confrontation with the LTTE demanding a separate 
Statehood since 1972. The LTTE problem began after the replacement of the independence Constitution 
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either of law and order or public order, and sought to exercise sovereign discretion to 
eliminate the movements. The international community, on the other hand, saw the 
secessionist activities as internal armed conflicts. This international characterization 
raised the possibility that the conflicts constituted humanitarian crises warranting 
international intervention.9 The classification of the secessionist movements also affected 
regulations regarding child protection. After the 1996 publication of the Grac’a Machel 
Report (Machel Report),10 which examined child participation in internal armed conflicts 
in failed states (namely, states lacking any democratic governance or rule of law), the 
U.N. and various international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) introduced 
accountability mechanisms to stop the recruitment of children for participation in those 
armed conflicts. These mechanisms included the option to permit international 
intervention when peace and security are at risk, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,11 
and the ability to declare child recruitment a war crime under the Rome Statute of the 
ICC.12 However, if conflicts stemming from secessionist movements are only regarded as 
internal struggles to maintain public order, as the established states suggest, then 
international accountability mechanisms are not available to address child participation. 
¶4   The concept of extending protections to children in “localized situations” (this 
term will be used throughout the article to refer to these secessionist movements) gained 
traction after the 2001 adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1379, which 
hereafter primarily sought to address post-conflict truth-and-reconciliation mechanisms 
for effective reintegration of child soldiers.13  However, it was over-shadowed by the 
Machel Report, which did not create distinctions between conflicts, but rather labeled all 
conflicts as “armed conflicts.” Child protections thus became contingent on receiving a 
label of “armed conflict.” Because actions taken to “maintain public order” did not 
receive this classification, they did not trigger international child protections, thereby 
reducing the applicability of measures intended to protect children in localized 
conflicts.14  In 2002, the international community tried to institute child protections at the 
state level. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights called upon states to review any 
domestic laws under which children could be prosecuted (including national security and 
counter-terrorism laws), and to assess those laws for compatibility with applicable 
international human rights instruments15 and general provisions of international 
humanitarian law.16 In 2003 the European Union issued its Guidelines on Children and 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the Republican Constitution in 1972.  
9 William Pfaff, A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 2-6 
(1995)(discussing humanitarian intervention by India in Bangladesh as a classical example of unilateral 
intervention on grounds of necessity of preventing Pakistan from engaging in human rights abuses against 
Bengalis (West Pakistan then) in south Asia). 
10 Expert of the Secretary-General, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 
1996) (by Grac’a Machel)[hereinafter Grac’a Machel Report]; See also G.A. Res. 51/77, ¶ 35, U.N. GAOR, 
51st Sess., Supp. No. 77, U.N. Doc. A/51/77 (Feb. 20, 1997) (The General Assembly adopted resolution 
51/77, in which it recommended that the Secretary-General appoint for a period of three years a Special 
Representative on the impact of armed conflict on children). 
11 S.C. Res. 1314, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1314 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(e) ,U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 
1998)[hereinafter Rome Statute]; See also S.C. Res. 1261, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (Aug. 30, 1999).  
13 S.C. Res. 1379, ¶¶ 8,12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1379 (Nov. 20, 2001). 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
16 U.N. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2002/47, U.N. Doc. E/2002/23- E/CN.4/2002/200, at ¶ 16 




Armed Conflict, stating its objective to “influence third world countries and non-state 
actors to implement international human rights and standards ... and to take effective 
measures to protect children from the effects of armed conflict, to end the use of children 
in armies and armed groups, and to end impunity.”17  
¶5 Subsequent Security Council resolutions recognized child participation in localized 
situations.18 That recognition linked child participation with the existence of an armed 
conflict, thereby obliging states to comply with international humanitarian law and 
applicable human rights law when prosecuting children. But because labeling localized 
conflicts as armed conflicts imposes a duty on affected states to act in conformity with 
the norms of international legal conduct,19 states faced with secessionist movements have 
refused to refer to those movements as armed conflicts. Instead, the states view secession 
as merely an internal, illegal activity. Some governments are notoriously reluctant to 
accept the existence of an internal armed conflict, preferring instead to declare a state of 
emergency or to claim that they are engaged in police action against terrorism.20 Without 
the label of “armed conflict” attached to these movements, states are not required to abide 
by the international community’s resolutions and guidelines. Thus, international efforts to 
categorize secessionist movements as armed conflicts ultimately result in distancing 
states affected by localized conflicts from mechanisms that could protect children. 
¶6 International advocacy on the issue of child soldiers usually focuses on states 
where the total collapse of the rule of law necessitates international intervention. While 
localized secessionist conflicts do not rise to the level of warranting international 
intervention, they do warrant international attention, especially on the issue of child 
soldiers. Rather than insisting on labeling these localized situations as armed conflicts, 
the international community should work within a local government’s framework and 
call on governments to both address the issue of child soldiers and provide for child 
protection.  
¶7 This paper addresses whether the U.N.’s recent efforts to enforce strict codes of 
conduct regarding child participation in conflicts have left behind the majority of children 
in localized conflicts. Part I of the paper examines the difficulty of defining and 
understanding child participation in democratic states with localized conflicts. Part II 
discusses the increased international scrutiny applied to an affected state that hesitates to 
recognize a localized armed conflict. Part III examines various international 
organizations’ approaches to addressing child participation in armed conflicts, and the 
results of imposing those approaches to child participation in secessionist movements. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Apr. 23, 2002) (The Commission’s resolution does not include a limitation on the nature of crimes 
committed by children or juveniles but rather enforces that the process should not defeat the object and 
purpose of international human rights or humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention).  
17 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict (Dec. 4, 2003), 
available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/human_rights_in_third_countries/r10113_en.htm. 
18 UNICEF refers to intrastate (internal) conflicts as low intensity conflicts and children are increasingly 
targeted to bear the brunt of consequences. The UNICEF defines low intensity conflict as those conflicts 
with fewer battle deaths and/or those wherein the parties to the conflict do not involve a State.  
19 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DANGEROUS DUTY: CHILDREN AND THE CHHATTISGARH CONFLICT (2008), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/naxalite0908web_0.pdf.  (The report on India’s 
Chhattisgarh’s state, refers to the situation as a conflict and refers to Maoist rebels (Naxalites) and state-
supported anti-Maoist vigilante groups as parties to the conflict resulting in a violation of the Paris 
Principles for the treatment of former child soldiers).   
20 See Rachel Brett, Juvenile Justice, Counter-terrorism and Children, 3 DISARMAMENT F. 30 (2002). 
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Continued advocacy is necessary to raise international awareness of the need to follow 
the approaches used to address child participation in armed conflicts to child participation 
in internalized conflicts. Affected states must enact domestic legislation and executive 
measures that encompass and protect child participants. 
I. THE COMPLEXITY IN DEFINING AND RECOGNIZING CHILD PARTICIPATION  
¶8 The Grac’a Machel Report’s chilling revelations of the rampant use, exploitation, 
and abuse of children in conflict settings stunned the international community. At the 
time of the report’s publication in 1996,21 the problem was so prevalent in Africa that the 
report focused on Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique 
(It also discussed non-African states including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Lebanon, and Colombia).22 The report classified all of these states as “States 
of Concern,” meaning that they merited international attention.23 
¶9  Haunted by previous reports of the horrors of child soldiers, the international 
community attempted to apply the model used for child soldiers in failed states with 
armed conflicts to child participation in third-world states witnessing localized conflicts. 
The Machel Report focused on the failed state approach and examined the impact of 
armed conflict on children in states whose governments had collapsed sufficiently to 
warrant a Chapter VII intervention.24 However, the failed state approach to child soldiers 
did not translate to localized conflicts for a number of reasons. First, the nature and extent 
of child participation in localized conflicts is very different from child participation in 
failed states. Second, those who recruit child soldiers in localized conflicts have a 
different level of accountability. Third, localized conflicts do not reach a level of violence 
that warrants international intervention. Finally, the failed state approach has had a 
disproportionate impact on children affected by localized conflicts. The high international 
accountability standards of the failed state approach led states that had previously 
acknowledged the use of child soldiers to shift their focus and deny any evidence of child 
soldiers. Thus, despite the efforts of international and national NGOs to highlight the 
widespread use of children in localized conflicts, states have been reluctant to explicitly 
recognize the problem of child soldiers. For example, India maintains that localized 
conflicts only have a socio-economic impact on children, namely the lack of access to 
education, health, and other basic services brought on by conflict create psychological 
problems.25 Nepal has voiced concern about media reports on the Maoists’ use of 
children as messengers, sentries, and spies,26 but claims that official data is not 
                                                 
21 Grac’a Machel Report, supra note 10.  
22 Id. at 12 (Three of the six regional consultations determined that regional priorities relating to children in 
armed conflict were in Africa. These were in Addis Ababa, 17-19 April 1995 for the Horn, Eastern, Central 
and Southern Africa; Cairo, August 1995, for the Arab region; and in Abidjan, 7-10 November 1995 for the 
children in West and Central Africa. These consultations were designed to draw the attention of 
governments, policy makers and opinion leaders).  
23 Id. 
24 See generally Grac’a Machel Report, supra note 10 (Listing these collapsed governments as Rwanda, 
Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique); see also U.N. Charter ch. VII 
25 See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of State Parties Due in 1995: 
India, ¶ 1085, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.10 (July 7, 1997). 
26 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Report of State Parties Due in 1997: 
Nepal, ¶ 303, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.30 (Dec. 3, 2004), available at 




available.27 Although the Nepalese government has recognized the need to protect 
children, it claims the conflict’s only repercussion for children is the limitation on access 
to education.28 Sri Lanka is one of the few states currently dealing with a localized 
conflict to formally recognize the problem of child soldiers, acknowledging publicly that 
its local secessionist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), uses child 
soldiers.29   
¶10  The child soldier template for failed states in the 1990s is not relevant to child 
participation in the current localized conflicts. That template forces states to either 
recognize illegal secessionist groups as legitimate actors, which would afford rights to the 
secessionist groups under international law, or regard the conflict as an action to maintain 
public order.30  States are unwilling to define the situations as armed conflicts and are 
reluctant to refer to child participants as child soldiers. Instead, child participants are 
often referred to as terrorists or insurgents and are treated with little or no concern.31 State 
security forces that apprehend child soldiers have little concern for their age.32 The 
children are seen as enemies of the state who are waging war against the nation.33 In 
many instances, underage suspects never go to court. 34 Government television news 
programs use nationalist rhetoric to announce the apprehension of child soldiers on a 
daily basis.35 Such announcements are met with public jubilation and disregard for the 
special status of the child soldiers. International safeguards36 are rarely implemented, and 
by the time these child “insurgents” appear in court, great harm has already occurred.37 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.bayefsky.com/reports/india_crc_c_93_add_5_2001.pdf. 
27 Id. at 302-303. 
28 Id. at 302, 304. 
29See U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Initial Report of States Parties Due in 1993: Sri Lanka, ¶ 
1085, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.13 (May 5, 1994) (In light of the escalating conflicts in the 1990s, and the 
LTTE’s increasing control in certain areas, Sri Lanka first recognized the LTTE’s use of child recruitment 
in the first State party report in 1994,wherein it was recognized that children younger than fifteen were 
involved in the guerrilla army). Norway’s later offer to play an intermediary in the peace process in 2000 
further addressed the issue of child soldiering. This was followed in 2002 by a tripartite action plan 
between Sri Lanka, LTTE and UNICEF which included a commitment by the LTTE to stop child 
recruitment and established three transit centers for the rehabilitation of child soldiers. However, the LTTE 
refused to discuss child recruitment during the cease fire agreement talks held in Geneva in February 2006. 
30 U.N. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, The 
Paris Principles (2007). 
31 See, e.g., CHAKMA SUHAS, Representative Correspondence From Asian Centre for Human Rights, 
ACHR Index: IND/JH/03/03, http://www.achrweb.org/countries/india/jharkhand/POTA0303.htm (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2010) (noting in India, children as young as fourteen years old have been detained under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and kept in jails for allegedly waging a war against the State. On 
July 9, 2002, fourteen year-old Mayanti Raj Kumari was arrested for allegedly waging war against the State 
under Sections 121 A (Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by sections 121 which includes Waging, 
or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India) and 122 
(Collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war against the Government of India) of the Indian Penal 
Code and POTA. She was detained in Ranchi jail and not in a juvenile home as required under the law).    
32 Id. 
33 Id.; See also Ramachandran Sudha, Delhi Targets Rebels With a Cause, ASIA TIMES (June 8, 2010), 
available at http://rememberjenkinsear.blogspot.com/2010/01/status-of-anti-maoist-war-in-orissa.html 
34 See Brett, supra note 20, at 33 (quoting RACHEL BRETT AND MARGARET MCCALLIN, CHILDREN: THE 
INVISIBLE SOLDIERS (2nd ed. 1998)). 
35 Id. 
36 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44st Sess., Supp. No. 25, 
U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 263, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000); U.N. Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in 
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¶11 Current localized conflicts also differ from the failed state conflicts of the 1990s in 
terms of the extent and type of child participation. In Sierra Leone (1991-99), Rwanda 
(1990-93), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (1998-2003), children were 
involved in heinous crimes that constituted grave breaches of the laws of war and 
triggered potential punishment under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.38 In 
localized conflicts, however, child participation is limited to assistance roles: children 
serve as messengers, take on administrative tasks in camps, or plant explosive devices 
against armed forces. The tacit approval of these acts in communities supporting 
secessionist movements leads children to believe they are behaving heroically.39 
Compared to the type of acts children performed in the more violent conflicts in failed 
states, these less egregious acts of children in localized conflicts merit rehabilitation 
rather than punishment. However, states are likely to punish apprehended children 
because it is easy to establish that they participated in the secessionist movements. In 
many developing states, children as young as seven can be held criminally accountable, 
which allows states to detain children before sending them to observation homes or 
treatment centers specifically created to treat at-risk youth.40  
¶12 Both Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo41 and Prosecutor v. Norman42 established that 
the recruitment of children younger than fifteen is a war crime. In addition, the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child absolutely prohibits armed groups 
from recruiting children under the age of eighteen. However, because only a limited 
number of states have ratified the Optional Protocol,43 and because many states have no 
                                                                                                                                                 
Emergency and Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 29/3318, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3318(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974); 
U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juveniles Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/40/33 (Nov. 29 1985); U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, G.A. 
Res. 45/113, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990).  
37 See ROMAINE ROLLAND, Asian Human Rights Commission, THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ELEVEN 
ASIAN NATIONS IN 2007—INDIA 22-24 (2007), available at 
http://material.ahrchk.net/hrreport/2007/India2007.pdf. 
38 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 (Aug. 12, 1949)(“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following 
acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment”). 
39 David Rosen, Without Precedent, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Sept. 2005) available at 
http://www.fdu.edu/newspubs/magazine/05sf/childsoldiers.html.  
40 U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, SOUTH ASIA AND THE MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, at 6, Table 
2, available at http://www.unicef.org/rosa/Criminal_Responsibility_08July_05%28final_copy%29.pdf.  
41 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, at 153-157 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF. 
(Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is accused of committing the following crimes from July 1, 2002 to Dec. 31, 2003: 
enlisting or conscripting children into the FPLC (the military wing of the Union des Patriotes Congolais) 
and using these children to participate actively in hostilities). 
42 Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003). 
43 India ratified the Optional Protocol on Nov. 30, 2005 (Entry into force on Dec. 30, 2005), Nepal on Jan. 
30, 2007 (Entry into force on Feb. 3, 2007) and Sri Lanka on Sept. 8, 2000 (Entry into force on Feb. 12, 
2002).  




domestic legislation prohibiting child recruitment, armed groups enjoy de facto 
impunity.44  
¶13 Further, peace negotiations rarely address accountability for those who recruit and 
use child soldiers. Eager to establish peace, states make an uneasy, but realistic tradeoff, 
granting amnesty to commanders who possibly bear the greatest responsibility for child 
soldier recruitment. In Sri Lanka, neither the Ceasefire Agreement of February 200245 nor 
the 2003 Action Plan for Children Affected by War between Sri Lanka and the LTTE46 
make any mention of a perpetrator’s accountability for child recruitment. 
Understandably, armed groups do not want to address the issue. States also seek to avoid 
the issue because addressing the grave offense of child recruitment could potentially 
derail the entire peace process. Unless a state is a failed or nearly failed state, such that 
international intervention is mandated, it is difficult to enforce international law 
pertaining to child soldiers in the absence of its incorporation into domestic law. 
II. THE AFFECTED STATE’S RELUCTANCE TO RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM 
¶14 Localized conflicts in third-world states (including not only those mentioned at the 
outset of this article, but also the Philippines, Indonesia, and East Timor) are clearly 
characterized by: (1) protracted violence against the established order; (2) a common 
ethnic, religious, or political community seeking self-determination; and (3) the presence 
of defined military and political wings of the warring armed groups. In order to achieve 
self-determination, communities engaged in secessionist movements employ protracted 
violence implemented through organized and hierarchical military and political wings. 
This easily meets the threshold for classification as an armed conflict.47 A state’s 
recognition of either self-determination or armed conflict is extremely risky. Acceptance 
of an intrastate-armed conflict invokes the application of Common Article 3, signaling 
that the state is no longer capable of maintaining order and that the armed group has 
                                                 
44 There was no legal provision criminalizing the recruitment of children in India or Nepal. The Juvenile 
Justice (Care and Protection) Act makes no reference to criminalization of child recruitment although 
Article 24 of the Indian Constitution.  The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000, No.56, Act of 
Parliament, 2006 (India); INDIA CONST. art 24, available at 
http://india.gov.in/govt/documents/english/coi_part_full.pdf (referring to rights against exploitation, and 
prohibits the employment of children below the age of fourteen in any factory or mine or other hazardous 
employment). See also COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIER REPORT 2008 
(2008), available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/home (noting that Nepal has no domestic legislation that 
criminalizes recruitment of children.  In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), finalized in 
November 2006, the parties agreed not to use or enlist children in any military force and to rescue and 
rehabilitate such children immediately. In contrast, Sri Lanka’s Penal Code was amended in 2006 to make 
“engaging/recruiting children for use in armed conflict” a crime punishable by twenty years in prison. Thus 
far, despite these provisions, no member of the LTTE or Karuna group has been arrested for child 
recruitment).   
45 Secretary-General of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process, Ceasefire Agreement, Feb. 
2002, available at http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/negotiations/cfa.  
46 The 2003 Action Plan for Children Affected by War was the first (and to date the only) human rights 
agreement formally entered into between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. It included a pledge by 
the LTTE to end all recruitment of children and to release children from its forces, both directly to the 
children’s families as well as to new transit centres that were constructed specifically for this purpose. 
CHARU LATA HOGG , THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) AND CHILD RECRUITMENT; 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2006 14, available at http://www.child-
soldiers.org/childsoldiers/CSC_AG_Forum_case_study_June_2006_Sri_Lanka_LTTE.pdf.  
47 See supra ¶4-¶6 (providing various definitions for “armed conflict”). 
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achieved a degree of international legal status akin to that of belligerents.48  Recognition 
of self-determination imposes a requirement on states to comply with Article 1 of the 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, which refers to “armed conflicts in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.”49  
¶15 This uncertainty of labeling localized situations as armed conflicts has led many 
states facing secessionist movements to refuse to acknowledge the problem or ratify 
treaties that would label the violence as an armed conflict. The post-1990s era of internal 
conflict has introduced the challenge of labeling violent secessionist movements as armed 
conflicts in order to ensure the application of at least minimal humanitarian norms. 
Although the Geneva Conventions do not provide a definition of “armed conflict,” the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decision in Prosecutor 
v. Tadić,50 the Prosecutor v. Akayesu decision out of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR),51 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,52 
provide more detailed, comprehensive definitions of “armed conflict,” all recognizing the 
need to expand the reach of the accountability process under humanitarian law to cover 
internal conflicts. In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY appeals chamber held: 
[A]rmed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between such groups within a State. 
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such conflicts 
and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion 
of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful 
settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law 
continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the 
                                                 
48 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 3, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 1(1), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II], available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/475?OpenDocument. 
This Protocol, which develops and supplements the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3  without 
modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by 
Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of 
a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable 
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. (Organization 
and territorial control refers to the issue of belligerency).  See also Moir Lindsay, THE LAW OF INTERNAL 
ARMED CONFLICT (Cambridge University Press 2004).  
49 Protocol I, supra note 48, art.1(4).The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed 
conflicts in which communities are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
50 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, ¶¶96-127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
51 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring 
States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, U.N. Doc. SC Res. 955, art. 4, 33 ILM 1598 (Nov. 
8,1994). 
52 Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 8(2)(e). 




case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, 
whether or not actual combat takes place there.53  
However, “the use of military force by individual persons or groups of persons will not 
suffice” to constitute an armed conflict.54   
¶16  The Tadić decision created a new temporal element, finding that an armed conflict 
exists whenever there is “protracted violence” extending beyond the cessation of 
hostilities until a final settlement is reached.55 In Prosecutor v. Boškoski, the ICTY 
expanded the definition to take into account the intensity of the conflict (as measured by 
both the escalation of violence and the reaction of the government), and the command 
structure of the parties (and their corresponding abilities to carry out organized 
operations).56 The ICTR made the temporal element even more explicit in Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, finding that armed violence extending over a few months satisfies the 
“protracted” requirement. In that case, the ICTR also found that the intensity of the 
violence was such that it constituted an “armed conflict” within the meaning of Common 
Article 3.57   
¶17  Although the Rome Statute also maintains that an armed conflict is defined by 
“protracted violence,” it fails to offer any substantive definition of the term “armed 
conflict.” It excludes from the definition of internal armed conflict any “situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, [and] isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence.”58 However, the wording of the Rome Statute’s Article 8(2)(f) suggests that it 
applies to one type of internal armed conflict—one involving protracted violence.59 This 
wide spectrum can accommodate a number of contemporary terms often used to describe 
internal violent situations, including armed rebellion, insurgency, terrorism, and 
militancy.  
¶18 The international legal definition of “armed conflict” raises a number of concerns. 
The low ‘protracted violence’ threshold, combined with the ICTY’s statement that an 
armed group does not have to exercise control over territory within a state, means that a 
                                                 
53 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 50, ¶70; see also Derek Jinks, September 11 And The Laws Of War, 28 
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 27 –28 (2003). 
54 D. Fleck ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts 40 (Oxford University Press 
1995). 
55 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 50. 
56 Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No.  IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 208-291 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
57 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 619-627 (Sep. 2, 1998), reprinted in 37 
I.L.M. 1399 (1998); see also Jinks, supra note 53, at 10. Common Article 3 does not specify the term 
“intensity of violence.” However, when read in conjunction with Article 1(2) of Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, the violence does not apply to, “situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature, as not being armed conflicts.”   
58 See Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 8. 
59 Id. art. 8(2)(f) ¶ 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply 
to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or 
other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when 
there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups. See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 32, 54 (1996).   
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greater number of intrastate conflicts qualify as armed conflicts.60 As a result, these 
internal situations open states up to international monitoring. Skepticism toward 
international interference in domestic affairs is often cited by states as a reason for failure 
to ratify international treaties.61 South Asian states provide perfect examples of this 
skepticism. While many states in the region suffer from protracted, internal strife (which 
qualifies as armed conflict), neither Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, nor Sri Lanka have ratified the ICC 
Statute or the Additional Protocols I or II to the Geneva Conventions.62 The level of 
internal conflict and the reasons for its existence vary in each of these states. The internal 
conflicts in India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal turn on the issue of self-determination, while the 
conflicts in Iran and Iraq have to do with politico-religious clashes.63 During discussion 
regarding the definition of “war crimes” within Article 8 of the Rome Statute, many 
states openly voiced concerns regarding defining “armed conflict” as ‘armed conflict not 
of an international character.' For example, India opposed the language on the grounds 
that it would result in the labeling of situations in Northeast India and Kashmir as armed 
conflicts.64  
¶19 States’ concerns over the labeling of internal situations as armed conflicts are also 
concerns over whether internal communities have the right to self-determination under 
international law. The right exists under Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).65 In most developing states, decolonization has been 
                                                 
60 For example, many intrastate conflicts in South Asia qualify as armed conflicts under the current 
international legal definition. 
61 For example, during the drafting process of additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, the Indian 
delegate noted, “the application of draft Protocol II to internal disturbances and other such situations would 
be tantamount to interference with the sovereign rights and duties of states. The definition of non-
international armed conflicts was still vague and no convincing argument has been put forward to justify 
the need for draft Protocol.”  CDDH/I/SR.2:VIII, 215 at 224 (taken from MOIR LINDSAY, THE LAW OF 
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 92 (Cambridge 2004)). See also Usha Ramanathan India and the ICC, J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 3, 627-631 (2005).  
62 ICRC, STATE PARTIES TO THE FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER RELATED 
TREATIES AS OF 23-MAR-2011, 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf  (last 
visited March 24, 2011). Afghanistan has signed but not ratified the ICC Statute. 
63 IRAN CHAMBER SOCIETY, IRAN-IRAQ WAR 1980-1988, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php (last visited Oct. 2010).   
64 Ramanathan, supra note 60, at 631.  India’s skepticism toward the term “armed conflict” became clearer 
during the question of ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). India 
was also strongly against the very concept of Additional Protocol II during the drafting process, fearing that 
it encourages intervention in domestic affairs. India noted, “the application of draft Protocol II to internal 
disturbances and other such situations would be tantamount to interference with the sovereign rights and 
duties of States. The definition of non international armed conflicts was still vague and no convincing 
arguments had been put forward to justify the  need for draft Protocol II, the provisions of which would not 
be acceptable to (his) delegation.” See CDDH/I/SR.23:VIII, 215 at 224.  
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].  












closely linked to self-determination. The situations in India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal are 
highlight the issue itself, as well as the states’ corresponding understanding of the periods 
of unrest caused by self-determination movements. In all three states, protracted 
situations of violence continue as armed groups claim to be fighting for self-
determination. And yet all three states refer to these situations as issues of law and order 
rather than armed conflicts.  
¶20 India has always maintained that no emergency situation exists in areas of unrest. 
However, some of these areas have been declared “disturbed areas” meriting deployment 
of armed forces under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act.66 Despite the extensive 
use of troops in Kashmir and Northeast India, the State continues to maintain that the 
situation falls within a law and order framework such that the use of troops constitutes 
aid to civil authorities.67 Nepal also considers the secessionist Maoist group to be a law 
and order problem. The Nepalese government has set up two commissions—the Dhami 
Commission in 1997 and the Deuba Commission in 2000—to identify the root causes of 
the Maoist insurgency and suggest remedial action. In identifying the insurgency as 
“political” in nature, and thus an issue of law and order, both Commissions paved the 
way for the government to retaliate through police action.68 Similarly, Sri Lanka’s 
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 is a public order issue through which Sri Lanka has 
sought to address the LTTE problem.69  




66 The UN Human Rights Committee: Addendum to the Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 
1992, India ( ¶ 37, CCPR/C/76/Add.6 (June 17, 1996), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b02f3.htm),  states “These Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 
and the Terrorist and Disruptive Security (Amendment) Act legislative measures have been enacted to meet 
certain special situations such as organized forms of terrorism and insurgency and are subject to adequate 
safeguards to ensure against violation of human rights.” 
67  The issue of the deployment of the armed forces in aid to civil authority was also raised during 
consideration of India's second periodic report U.N. Human Rights Committee in 1996. In reply, India 
noted that “[T]he Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 was enacted when India was faced with an 
acute law and order situation on account of activities of insurgents in the border areas in the eastern 
frontiers of India. Armed raids were being carried out by such insurgents in the small towns, villages and in 
the tea gardens followed by destruction of property, wanton killings, kidnapping and other acts of violence 
with the result that people in these areas were living under constant terror and were apprehensive about the 
safety of their lives and property. The army had to be called out to aid civil authorities for the apprehension 
of the offenders, who were usually armed, and to assist in the detection and search for the sources of 
weapons and ammunition supply.” See UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), UN Human Rights 
Committee: Addendum to the Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1992, India, 
CCPR/C/76/Add.6 (June 17, 1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b02f3.htm. 
Similarly when the Act was challenged in the Nagaland People’s Movement for Human Rights v. Union of 
India case  ([1997] ICHRL 117) on the imposition of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act calling for 
the deployment of the armed forces in disturbed areas on grounds that maintenance of public order was a 
state subject and the  Parliament had  no legislative competence to the enact the Act. The court ruled that   
deployment of armed forces was in aid of civil power. See Supreme Court of India on Armed Forces 
(Special Powers) Act, 1958, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 463-464, available at 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/IN/COHR_IND_UPR_S1_2008anx_Annex%20
XXIII_Supreme%20Court%20%20ruling%20on%20AFSPA.pdf. 
68 Also see Dalal, Dev Raj, Nepal Supporting Peace Processes Through a Systemic Approach (Bergh of 
Foundation for Peace Support 2005). The report also says politicalization of the insurgency also allowed 
the “militariz[ation of] the local political conflict.” 
69 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 1979 [Sri Lanka], ¶ 137, July 20, 1979, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4561dac84.html (see also the Preamble of the Act, 
“…WHEREAS public order in Sri Lanka continues to be endangered ….”). 
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¶21 The ICCPR Article 1 right to self-determination can be linked to situations that 
qualify as armed conflicts under international law. When a local ethnic or tribal 
population seeks self-rule or independence (and subsequent de facto control over certain 
territory) through protracted strife, the international right to self-determination is 
implicated and the violence qualifies as an international armed conflict. Thus, state 
sovereignty is threatened both when the international community invokes the right to 
self-determination and when states themselves recognize the right. Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling approving the legality of 
Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, strengthen the cause of secessionist movements 
seeking self-determination through the creation of conflict with state sovereignty.70 The 
ICJ concluded that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of 
declarations of independence,”71 and that the February 17, 2008 declaration of 
independence did not violate general international law.72 On the question of lex specialis, 
as created by Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the ICJ ruled that there is no 
general prohibition against a unilateral declaration of independence. The ICJ also 
examined the lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law 
against the background of Resolution 1244, and noted: “…the international law of self-
determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the 
peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation…[and]…a great many new States have come into existence 
as a result of the exercise of this right.”73 However, the ICJ also stated that questions 
regarding declarations of independence must be analyzed “on a case-by-case basis, 
considering all relevant circumstances.”74  
III. CHILD PARTICIPATION AND INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY     
¶22  Immediately following the publication of the Grac’a Machel Report, the U.N. 
General Assembly called for the appointment of a Special Representative on the Impact 
of Armed Conflict on Children.75 The U.N. Security Council condemned “the targeting of 
children in armed conflicts, including their humiliation, brutalization, sexual abuse, 
abduction and forced displacements, as well as their recruitment and use in hostilities in 
violation of international law,” and “called upon all parties concerned to put an end to 
such activities.”76 Olara Otunnu, the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed 
                                                 
70 Accordance With the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. No. 141 (July 22), available at www.icj-
cij.org/homepage/pdf/20100722_KOS.pdf. 
71 Id.  The Court has concluded above that the adoption of the declaration of independence of Feb. 17, 2008 
did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional 
Framework. Consequently the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of 
international law. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 30. 
74 Id. at 41. 
75 G.A. Res. 51/77, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/77 (Feb. 20, 1997), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-77.htm. The General Assembly adopted resolution 51/77, in 
which it recommended that the Secretary-General appoint for a period of three years a Special 
Representative on the impact of armed conflict on children. 
76 U.N. President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the S.C., U.N. Doc. 




Conflict, presented the Security Council with information and statistics on the use of 
child soldiers.77 At that time, “over 250,000 children under the age of eighteen were 
serving in government military forces or with armed rebel groups.”78 In over fifty 
countries, children served as cooks, spies, messengers, “comfort women,” and soldiers in 
armed conflicts.79  
¶23 The grim reality of the exploitation and vulnerability of children immersed in 
conflict led the Security Council to pass six important resolutions pertaining to child 
soldiers and the general effects of armed conflict on children. In 1999, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1261, noting that international law prohibits the forced or 
voluntary recruitment of children as soldiers, and stating that it is a war crime to conscript 
or enlist children under the age of fifteen into national armed forces or to allow them to 
participate in hostilities.80 The resolution called upon states to comply strictly with their 
obligations under international law and to “ensure that the protection, welfare, and rights 
of children are taken into account during peace negotiations.”81 It also called upon states 
to undertake feasible measures to protect and minimize the harm children suffer during 
armed conflict.82  
¶24 In 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1314, which noted that the 
“committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, including that relating to children, in situations of 
armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security.”83 This 
resolution linked the mandatory power of the Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter with the issue of children and armed conflict.84 The means of enforcement 
available under Chapter VII (including complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations, severance of diplomatic relations,85 demonstrations, blockades, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security)86 were also reflected in the subsequent country-specific resolutions. 
For example, Resolution 1332, pertaining to armed conflict in the DRC, called upon 
“armed forces and groups to immediately cease all campaigns for the recruitment, 
abduction, cross-border deportation and use of children,” and demanded “immediate 
steps for the demobilization, disarmament, return and rehabilitation of all such 
children.”87 As a result of this resolution, 165 Congolese children were returned to 
                                                                                                                                                 
S/PRST/1998/18 (June 29, 1998). 
77 Olara A. Otunnu, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Children, U.N. General Assembly, Third 
Committee, Introductory Statement (Oct. 27, 1999). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 S.C. Res. 1261, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (Aug. 25, 1999), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f22d10.htm. 
81 Id. ¶ 3, 7.  
82 Id. ¶ 9. 
83 S.C. Res. 1314, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1314 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
84 See Id., which notes “that the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons, 
including children, and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, including that relating to children, in situations of armed conflict may 
constitute a threat to international peace and security, and in this regard reaffirms its readiness to consider 
such situations and, where necessary to adopt appropriate steps.” 
85 U.N. Charter art. 41. 
86 Id. art. 43. 
87 S.C. Res. 1332, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1332 (Dec. 14, 2000). 
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UNICEF from a training camp in Uganda.88 In accordance with Article 99 of the Charter 
of the United Nations89 the Security Council issued Resolution 1379, requesting that the 
Secretary General provide a list of every party to an armed conflict that recruits or uses 
children,90 and calling on member states to “[p]ut an end to impunity, prosecute those 
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other egregious 
crimes perpetrated against children ... and ensure that post-conflict truth-and-
reconciliation processes address serious abuses involving children.”91  
¶25  In 2003, the Security Council recognized that the “conscription or enlistment of 
children under the age of fifteen into the national armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities is classified as a war crime as mentioned in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court,” and called “for ‘an era of application’ of 
international norms and standards for the protection of children affected by armed 
conflict.”92 Further emphasizing its concern over the continued recruitment of child 
soldiers in violation of international law, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1539 
in 2004,93 reminding states that the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child requires states to set a minimum age of eighteen for compulsory recruitment of 
children for armed conflict and takes measures to ensure children under eighteen years of 
age do not directly take part in hostilities.94 Finally, in 2005, the Security Council called 
upon the Secretary General to work with national governments, relevant United Nations 
agencies, and national and international civil society groups to implement monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms on children and armed conflict for six egregious violations of 
children’s rights during armed conflicts.95  
¶26 The combination of Security Council resolutions, the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC), and the Rome Statute,96 along with the general call for an era of 
application of international law, served to solidify the recruitment of child soldiers as a 
crime under international law.97 These various instruments also helped the Office of the 
                                                 
88 U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/56/342 S/2001/852 (Sept. 7, 
2001) [hereinafter Children and Armed Conflict]. 
89 U.N. Charter art. 99 (permitting the Secretary General to “bring to the attention of the Security Council 
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”). 
90 The listing of offending parties in the Secretary-General’s annual reports to the Security Council, which 
gives this report a unique saliency and impact, has evolved in three stages. First, the Security Council in 
S/RES/ 1379 (2001) requested a “list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children…in situations 
that are on the Security Council’s agenda”.  S.C. Res. 1379, U.N. Doc., S/RES/1379 (Nov. 20, 2001).  This 
provided the basis for the listing practice. Second, in 2003, the Security Council added a new provision in 
the context of listing, i.e. “taking into account the parties to other armed conflicts that recruit or use 
children which are mentioned in the report.”  S.C. Res. 1460, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1460 (Jan. 30, 2003).  This 
provided the basis for the second list, contained in Annex II since 2003. Finally, in 2004, the Security 
Council added another provision in the context of listing, i.e. “bearing in mind all other violations and 
abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict.” S.C. Res. 1539, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1539 
(Apr. 22, 2004). This provided the basis for recording other grave abuses under the lists. 
91 S.C. Res. 1379, ¶ 9(a), U.N. Doc. (Sept. 18, 2001). 
92 S.C. Res. 1460, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1460 (Jan. 30, 2003). 
93 S.C. Res. 1539, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1539 (Apr. 22, 2004). 
94 Id.  
95 S.C. Res. 1612, ¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (July 25, 2005). 
96 These included the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the ICC Statute, S/RES/1539 
(2004), S/RES/1460 (2003), S/RES/1314 (2000), S/RES/1379 (2001) and S/RES/1261(1999). 
97  Children and Armed Conflict, supra note 88. 




Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict 
(SRSG/CAAC),98 UNICEF, and several NGOs to raise advocacy and awareness, 
strengthen international standards and norms, and increase monitoring and reporting. 
Although the CRC Optional Protocol on children in armed conflict encourages states to 
ensure that no child under the age of eighteen participates in hostilities, international law 
does not prohibit the voluntary participation in hostilities by children over fifteen.99 The 
Optional Protocol does, however, impose an absolute prohibition on the recruitment of 
children under the age of eighteen by armed groups.100 
¶27 The development of the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone101 (“the 
Special Court”) and the Sierra Leone Law,102 adopted after that country’s 1991 
conflict,103 added a layer of accountability for child soldiers between the ages of fifteen 
and eighteen.104 Although many children were conscripted into combat in the conflict, a 
                                                 
98 In 1996, Ms. Graç’a Machel, an independent expert appointed by the Secretary-General, submitted her 
report to the General Assembly entitled Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.  The report led to the 
adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 51/77 of 12 December 1996, establishing the mandate of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict for a period of three 
years. The Assembly has since extended this mandate four times and most recently by its resolution 
A/RES/63/241 of 13 March 2009. 
The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
UNITED NATIONS, available at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/theoffice.html. 
99 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/4/25 (November 20, 
1989). 
100 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, 
art. 4(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (“[A]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State 
should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.”). 
101 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2002). 
102 Id. See also Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
Establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), Sierra Leone-U.N., Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 137, 147 [hereinafter Sierra Leone]. 
103 The issues of natural resources (diamonds) in Sierra Leone led to a civil war in 1991 amidst political 
upheaval over a multi-party democratic system of governance. The Revolutionary United Front forces in 
Sierra Leone committed grave atrocities and overthrew the elected government and influenced control over 
the diamond mines. The Revolutionary United Front forces in Sierra Leone committed grave atrocities and 
overthrew the elected government and influenced control over the diamond mines. 
104 See Sierra Leone, supra note 102, art. 7, which states:  
Jurisdiction over persons of 15 years of age:  
1. The Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 15 
at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.  Should any person who was at the time 
of the alleged commission of the crime between 15 and 18 years of age come before the 
Court, he or she shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or 
her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into 
and assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance with international human 
rights standards, in particular the rights of the child.   
2. In the disposition of a case against a juvenile offender, the Special Court shall order any of 
the following: care guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, counseling, 
foster care, correctional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved schools 
and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or 
programmes of child protection agencies. 
Also, at the time when the statute came into effect the age of criminal responsibility in Sierra Leone was 10 
years which has now been raised to 14 years by the Sierra Leonean Parliament in 2007 in the Child Rights 
Bill.  See e.g., Juvenile Justice Panel, General Comment No. 10 Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice: Fact 
sheet #4, available at 
http://www.juvenilejusticepanel.org/resource/items/D/C/DCI_GC10FactSheet4_EnsureAppropriateAgeofC
R08_EN.pdf (Last visited Oct. 20, 2010).  See also Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children and the Quest 
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significant number of children voluntarily participated in the brutalities.105 Children were 
involved in some of the most heinous crimes committed in violation of the laws and 
customs of war: for example, the RUF forces in Sierra Leone (30% of whom were child 
soldiers) implemented a war operation known to RUF commanders as “Operation No 
Living Thing,” in which rebel forces ripped through the capital city of Freetown, raping 
thousands of women, killing innocent civilians, and destroying the capital city. These 
brutal operations gave juvenile soldiers the reputation of being cruel combatants.106 Many 
child combatants were also victims themselves: abducted by rebels under the effects of 
drugs, coercion and threats, these children were manipulated into maiming their 
countrymen.  
¶28 During the post-conflict negotiations in Sierra Leone, the government did not spare 
juvenile soldiers, demanding punishment (including the death penalty) for all culpable 
parties.107 The SRSG supported the Special Court’s jurisdiction to prosecute children 
over the age of fifteen who “bear the greatest responsibility” for the atrocities.108 The 
SRSG also recommended that the penalty be limited to imprisonment as a matter of last 
resort, subject to judicial reviews, and only if the child’s family was able to have close 
and frequent contact.109 The Special Court’s founding statute allows for consideration of 
counseling, foster care, educational programs, and reintegration programs, but not 
imprisonment.110  
¶29 The issue of accountability for children in Sierra Leone sparked a debate in the 
international community. The SRSG and organizations including Amnesty International 
and the International League for Human Rights (ILHR) supported juvenile 
accountability. The SRSG felt that child soldiers could “benefit from participation in a 
process that ensures accountability for one’s actions, respects the procedural guarantees 
                                                                                                                                                 
for Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone, 55 J. INT’L AFF. 1, 8-9 (2001) available at 
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/3493258-1.html (debate regarding personal jurisdiction over 
former child soldiers.). 
105 See Rachel Brett, AMNESTY INT’L UK, Child Soldiers, IN THE FIRING LINE: WAR AND CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 56, 61 (1999) (stating that children’s negative experiences with governmental armed forces was the 
predominant factor in the children’s decision to volunteer to fight). See also Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone’s 
Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers, 9 No. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 18 (2002) (In fact, 
some juvenile soldiers voluntarily served as commanders and foot soldiers during executions and 
mutilations.); Jeana Webster, Note, Sierra Leone—Responding to the Crisis, Planning for the Future: The 
Role of International Justice in the Quest for National and Global Security, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 731, 755 (2001); and U.N. Secretary-General, The Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 31 - 38, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).   
See also
 
Michael A. Corriero, The Involvement and Protection of Children in Truth and Justice Seeking 
Processes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 337, 339 (2002) (These 
juvenile soldiers earned a reputation throughout the region as fearless and blood-thirsty killers.).  
106 See Joshua A. Romero, The Special Court For Sierra Leone And The Juvenile Soldier Dilemma, 2 NW. 
U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 8, 9 ¶ 20 (2004).(During the conflict, an estimated five thousand juvenile soldiers 
committed widespread and systematic atrocities in defiance of international conventions, violations of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.). See also Zarifis, supra note 
105. 
107 See Brutal Child Army Grows Up, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 10, 2000, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_743000/743684.stm; See also U.N. Secretary-
General, The Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶ 
31-38, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). 
108 S.C. Res. 1315, art.1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2002). 
109 Ilene Cohn, supra note 104. 
110 Joshua A. Romero, The Special Court For Sierra Leone And The Juvenile Soldier Dilemma, 2 NW. U. J. 
INT'L HUM. RTS. 8, 9 (2004). 




appropriate in the administration of juvenile justice, and considers ... the child’s 
reintegration into society.”111 The ILHR insisted that a process that tries juveniles but 
does not impose punitive prison sentences can simultaneously provide some 
compensation for the victims and encourage communities to reintegrate children who had 
victimized those communities during the conflict.112 Amnesty International supported the 
argument that failure to hold children accountable would create a climate of impunity and 
lead to the denial of justice for the victims, but noted that the child’s age should be a 
mitigating factor in a process of accountability.113  
¶30 The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers also supported the prosecution of 
any juvenile under the age of eighteen, but argued that such action should be in line with 
international principles of juvenile justice,114 and that the child should be guaranteed 
rehabilitation rather than punishment.115 Others felt that judgment by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was sufficient “punishment” for juvenile soldiers, and 
that prosecution would only weaken rehabilitative efforts.116 Providing supervised access 
to rehabilitation for the most recalcitrant and feared young offenders, would ensure 
individual reintegration, social reconciliation, and ultimately a more solid basis for 
lasting peace.117 
¶31 Several organizations, including UNICEF, Cause Canada, the International Rescue 
Committee, Save the Children (UK), and a representative of the National Child 
Protection Committee in Freetown, have expressed concerns regarding the prosecution of 
                                                 
111 Id.  
112 Letter from Ms. Kakuna Kerina, African Program Director, International League for Human Rights to 
the U.N. Security Council Delegation in Sierra Leone (Oct. 6, 2000). 
113 Amnesty Int’l, Sierra Leone: Recommendations on the draft Statute of the Special Court, Nov. 14, 2000,  
available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000143.html (suggesting that few children would 
have voluntarily committed serious crimes and noting that “in cases where a person under 18 did act 
entirely voluntarily, and was in control of his or her actions, …  they should be held to account for those 
actions in an appropriate setting, with due weight given to their age and other mitigating factors. … Where 
an individual can be held responsible for his or her actions, failure to bring them to justice will perpetuate 
impunity and lead to a denial of justice to the victims."). 
114 The International principles of juvenile justice include U.N. Conventions of the Child (G.A. Res. 44/25, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989)), the United Nations GA Declaration on the Protection of Women 
and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflicts (G.A. Res. 29/3318, U.N. Doc. A/29/3318 (Dec. 14, 
1974)), United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juveniles Justice 1985 (The 
Beijing Rules, G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1983)), and the U.N. Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (JDL) (G.A. Res. 46/113, U.N. Coc. A/RES/46/113 (Dec. 
14, 1990)). 
115 The Coalition also argued that the court should prioritize prosecution of the adults responsible for 
recruiting the child soldiers, noting the limited resources and capacity of Sierra Leone’s court. See 
generally, Letter from Letter from Judit Arenas, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (Nov. 7, 2000) 
and Letter from Joe Becker, Steering Committee of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, to 
Ambassador Richard Holbrroke, USA Mission to the U.N. (Oct. 12, 2000). See also Letter from Human 
Rights Watch, Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone to United Nations Security Council (Nov. 1, 
2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/11/sl-ltr.htm (expressing the view that “Although we 
believe that children should be accountable for their offenses, in light of their inherent immaturity as well 
as the subjection of many child combatants to forcible abduction, brutalization and other forms of coercion, 
we recommend that the Special Court’s limited resources would be far better used in pursuit of justice for 
adult offenders, rather than children.”). 
116 See Diane M. Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167, 177 (2001). 
117 Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children and the Quest for Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone 55 J. Int'l 
Aff. 18 (2001), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/government/3493258-1.html. 
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child soldiers.118  These organizations believe that such measures undermine efforts at 
rehabilitation, stigmatize children, and place them at risk of re-recruitment.119 The 2001 
adoption of the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed 
conflicts reflects this preference for rehabilitation rather than prosecution. It requires that 
state parties submit to the CRC information on “the criminal liability of children for 
crimes they may have committed during their stay with armed forces or groups and the 
judicial procedure applicable, as well as safeguards to ensure that the rights of the child 
are respected.”120  
¶32 The international response toward children caught in localized conflicts is limited 
due to the dilemma of “legally reconcil[ing] respect for the preeminent principle of state 
sovereignty with the critical human rights necessity.”121 In all of the UN’s Chapter VII 
interventions, with the exception of Burundi, the parties to the conflicts at issue engaged 
in child recruitment.122 But, as discussed above, permitting Chapter VII intervention123 
dangerously limits the implementation of child protection mechanisms in localized 
conflicts within democratic states. Thus, because rule of law and democratic governance 
prevail in these states, the possibility of intervention in these states is less likely; indeed, 
intervention in democratic states contradicts well-established principles of state 
sovereignty under Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter.124  
¶33 Asymmetric warfare and the complexity of intrastate conflicts is a new 
phenomenon within contemporary conflicts. In the future, Article 2(7) protections of the 
U.N. Charter, which limit the UN’s ability to intervene in matters under domestic 
jurisdiction, will undermine U.N. Chapter VII intervention. Moreover, it will be difficult 
to argue that democratic states forfeit their right to non-intervention due to either their 
unlawful practices or their evident inability to protect human rights in such deteriorating 
localized situations.125 To remedy the potential limitations of U.N. intervention, many 
commentators have proposed imposing an international “conservatorship” involving a 
loss of sovereignty to the affected state,126 or utilizing sanctions as a quick, flexible tool 
to promote democracy and help restore a failed state.127  
                                                 
118 See generally, id.  
119 Id. 
120 U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Guidelines Regarding Initial Reports to be Submitted by 
States Parties under Article 8(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Article 6, ¶ 3(f), U.N. Doc. CRC/OP/AC/1 (November 14, 
2001). 
121 Christopher C. Joyner, “The Responsibility to Protect”: Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness of 
Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 694 (2007).   
122 U.N. Security Council, Summary Statement by the Secretary-General on Matters of Which 
the Security Council is Seized and on the Stage Reached in their Consideration, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. S/2002/30 
(March 14, 2002).  
123 S.C. Res. 1314, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1314 (Aug. 11, 2000) (formally affirming that the protection and 
security of children affected by armed conflict was an international peace and security issue, and therefore, 
firmly within the remit of the Security Council). 
124 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, art. 2 ¶ 1 (Oct. 24, 1945) (the Organization is based on 
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members). 
125 ALLEY RODERIC, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: WARS WITHOUT 
ENDS 91 (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2004). 
126 Henry J. Richardson III, “Failed States,” Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist 
Nostalgia And Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 2 (1996).  
127 Id. at n.19.   




¶34 The international community’s failure to intervene in democratic states also stems 
from the failure to address secessionist issues on two axes: human rights and state 
sovereignty. The UN’s use of humanitarian intervention peaked in the 1990s when there 
was a global ideological shift in favor of human rights protections. From its creation in 
1945 until the early 1990s, the U.N. launched fourteen humanitarian missions. In 
contrast, during the 1990s there were thirty-five U.N. missions, sixteen of which took 
place under a Chapter VII mandate128 and nine of which are on-going.129 Fifty-six of the 
fifty-nine world conflicts that occurred between 1990 and 2000 were intrastate.130 
International legal conduct in these intrastate conflicts was limited to the imposition of 
international sanctions either under Chapter VI and VII of the U.N. Charter or under 
triangular agreements between the ICRC, the state, and the armed groups, in which the 
parties agreed to abide by the principles or the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.131 
From 2000 to 2005, the U.N. has launched sixteen additional missions, only six of which 
were mandated. The sharp decline in humanitarian missions is indicative of the shift 
toward the idea of states’ sovereign primacy. An emphasis on sovereignty does not 
necessarily mitigate the complex humanitarian problems states face. States strongly 
advocate that localized conflicts are internal matters, and have dealt with such conflicts 
by declaring states of emergency or reinforcing domestic laws with special legislation.132 
                                                 
128 These States were Afghanistan, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan, and The Former Yugoslavia. 
1990-1999 UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/events/peacekeeping60/1990s.shtml (last assessed March 24, 2011). 
129  Id.  
130 The three interstate conflicts during this period were: Iraq-Kuwait, India-Pakistan, and Eritrea-Ethiopia. 
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) YEARBOOK, ARMAMENTS, 
DISARMAMENTS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (Oxford University Press 2001). 
131 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36d2.htm. See also Michel Veuthey, Implementation And 
Enforcement Of Humanitarian Law And Human Rights Law In Non-International Armed Conflicts: The 
Role Of The International Committee Of The Red Cross, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 83, 92 (1983). 
132 For example, India’s Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) permits deployment of troops in 
violent areas without any special invocation. The AFSPA has been applied in violent regions (including 
Kashmir and the northeastern part of the country) where secessionist forces have fought for self-
determination. Since self-determination as a right is not recognized by the State, the state has declared the 
areas to be disturbed areas fulfilling the precondition for the deployment of the armed forces in these areas. 
The Act grants powers to the armed forces to fire upon or otherwise use force, including lethal force, 
against any person who acts in contravention of any law or order against civilians without warning (Section 
4(a)), to destroy shelters from which armed attacks are made or likely to be made (Section 4(b)), or enter 
and search or arrest without warrant ‘any person who has committed or  is about to commit a cognizable 
offence’ (Section 4(c&d)). It also requires government permission to initiate proceedings against, ‘any 
person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act’ 
(Section 6). India came under scrutiny after the submission of the State’s first report to the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) pursuant to Article 41 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/10/Add.8 (13 July 1983)). During the examination of the first report, the HRC questioned 
the rationale for the lack of any kind of mention in the Indian Constitution, to the non derogable rights 
found in article 4 of the Covenant (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.493 (Sir Vincent Evans)) The HRC raised 
concerns about the situation in the Northeast, in general, and the AFSPA, in particular. The HRC said that 
certain provisions of the Act (AFPSA) effectively derogated the rights contained in Article 6, 9 and 14 of 
the Covenant (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1041, Prof Rosalyn Higgins; and U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1042, ¶ 
16). The HRC also raised concerns that the existing practice has led to a ‘de facto’ declaration emergency 
which were not in line with the Covenant provisions. 
The present Act now extends to the whole of Manipur, Nagaland and Assam, the Tirap and Changlang 
districts of Arunachal Pradesh and a 20 km belt in the States having common border with Assam and 22 
Vol. 9:1] MUKUL SAXENA 
 
79
State action with regard to localized conflicts does not protect children. The international 
community therefore needs to assist states in understanding the complex realities of 
intrastate warfare. Only then can states develop and implement effective measures to 
protect children. Without action, international law is at risk of being perceived as largely 
irrelevant to the modern reality of child soldiers.133  
¶35  In 2000, at the start of Asia’s first conference on child soldiers, the Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers announced that Asia ranked second only to Africa in the 
use of child soldiers.134 This announcement came a week before the release of UNICEF’s 
first report on child soldiers in East Asia and the Pacific region.135 The UNICEF report 
found that of the 300,000 child soldiers worldwide, one-fourth were in East Asian 
countries (including Myanmar, Indonesia, East Timor, Cambodia, Philippines and Papua 
New Guinea).136 When the Security Council published Resolution 1379, there were 
concerns that it was too Africa-centric.137 The resolution and its progeny resolutions 
included a list of states parties that recruit and use child soldiers.138 This group of 
resolutions recognized twenty-three armed groups involved in recruiting child soldiers for 
conflict situations in five states: of those five, four were African states (the sole outlier 
was Afghanistan).139 Subsequent reports emphasized the list of states mentioned in the 
Machel Report,140 leading to progress toward ending the recruitment and use of children 
in armed conflict.141 While emphasis on these states was an important aspect of the 
reports, the reports lacked a more in depth analysis of the underlying problems in other 
affected states. For example, some Asian countries, including Myanmar, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka, are consistently mentioned as “States of Concern”142 but are not on the Security 
Council’s agenda.143 Because these states represent areas with complex problems very 
                                                                                                                                                 
Police Stations and part of areas under 5 Police Stations in Tripura in the Northeast India.  In Jammu and 
Kashmir, “the Districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, Poonch, Rajouri , Doda, Srinagar, Budgam, 
Anantnag, Pulwama, Baramulla & Kupwara” In effect, the Act is in force in the entire state of Jammu and 
Kashmir and nearly the entire North-eastern region of India with the same substantive provisions.   
133 ALLEY RODERIC, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: WARS WITHOUT 
ENDS 115 (Ashgate Publishing Limited, London 2004). 
134 Press Release, Amnesty International, Children as Cannon-Fodder: The Darkest Side of Asian Conflicts 
(May 10, 2000), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA010012000. 
135 Memorandum from UNICEF, Adult Wars, Child Soldiers, Voices of Children Involved in Armed 
Conflict in the East Asia and Pacific Region (Jun. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc06/pdfs/pub_adultwars_en.pdf.  
136 Id. 
137 Thalif Deen, U.N. Report on Child Soldiers Ignores Worst Offenders, INT’L SERV. PRESS, Nov. 7, 2002, 
available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1107-05.htm. 
138 S.C. Res. 508, ¶16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1379 (Nov. 20, 2001); S.C. Res. 1460, ¶16(a), U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1460 (Jan. 30, 2003); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and 
Armed Conflict, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. Ss/2005/72, 
A/59/695 (Feb. 9, 2005). 
139 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, delivered to 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1299; see also Thalif Deen, supra note 137. 
140These include Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Myanmar, Lebanon, and Columbia. Supra Part I. 
141 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, delivered to the Security Council and 
the General Assembly, supra note 138. The report states, “Information on compliance and progress in 
ending the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict by those parties mentioned in my 2003 report 
(A/58/546-S/2003/1053 and Corr.1 and 2), including information on other grave violations and abuses (see 
resolution 1539 (2004), para. 15 (a)).” 
142 See supra Part I (listing “States of Concern”). 
143 It is estimated that 75,000 child soldiers participate in rebel groups in Myanmar In Nepal, child recruits 




different from those in failed states, they demand urgent international attention. However, 
international NGOs have attempted to table issues relating to child soldiers in states other 
than Africa, choosing to instead focus efforts on the States of Concern. 
¶36  Although the recruitment occurring in other countries needs to be addressed, 
Africa is still the continent that recruits the most children. For example, the 1999 
background document to the African Conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers 
estimated that more than 120,000 children under eighteen years of age are currently 
participating in armed conflicts across Africa.144 In mid-2004, the Coalition to Stop the 
Use of Child Soldiers stated that Africa has the largest number of child soldiers, with up 
to 100,000 children believed to be involved in armed conflicts in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.145 
¶37  Because the problem of child participation is country specific, the international 
community cannot create a general template to deal with the issue. Instead, the answer to 
the problem of child participation in localized secessionist movements lies in states’ 
recognition of the problem of child participation and commitment to meeting their 
obligations under international law to protect children during conflicts. National juvenile 
justice mechanisms are best suited to address the needs of children in conflict situations. 
Domestic legal structures, including the judiciary, and national armed forces, including 
the police, play a fundamental role in protecting children. Unless national legislatures are 
willing to implement domestic measures to address the issue of child soldiers, children 
will continue to suffer. International safeguards will only serve to protect children when 
states reflect a will to abide by them and incorporate international standards into domestic 
law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶38  States’ reluctance to recognize the international legal consequences of internal 
strife is based on their misunderstanding of the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference. That misunderstanding, in turn, makes it virtually impossible for the 
international community to implement international humanitarian and human rights 
law.146 This state reluctance is not perceived as a grave or imminent problem. However, 
the problem of child participation in localized conflicts illustrates how important it is to 
address this issue. In today’s world, there are rarely instances of failed states or civil wars 
leading to the total collapse of the rule of law such that full-scale international 
intervention is warranted. Instead, intrastate conflicts in the modern world occur in states 
with a well-established rule of law. States have invariably perceived the problem as one 
of merely law and order, and therefore have either not recognized the conflict or the 
participation of children, or have done too little to protect child participants. 
                                                                                                                                                 
have been used in armed conflicts since the Secretary General’s first report. Nepal has no commitment or 
action plan to halt the recruitment and use of children, induce child disarmament, or create demobilization 
and reintegration programs.  
144 See The Use of Children as Soldiers in Africa: A country Analysis of Child Recruitment and 
Participation in Armed Conflict, http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/chilsold.htm. 
145 See Africa-Child Soldiers, http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/global-
reports?root_id=159&directory_id=165 (follow “Global Report 2004 – Africa Overview”). 
146 See EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSON AND MATERIAL 
FIELDS OF APPLICATION 23-24 (Kluwer Academic Publishers1992) (mentioning conflicts in Angola, 
Mozambique, Afghanistan and El Salvador). 
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¶39  The association of the term ‘child soldier’ with an armed conflict has led states to 
avoid recognition of the problem when it occurs within domestic borders. The 
international community ushered in a climate of change by encouraging states to address 
the issue of child participation through incorporation into domestic laws of well-
established principles of international law on the administration of juvenile justice. This 
comprehensive approach will enable states to increase domestic capacity to meaningfully 
address the issue of child soldiers while respecting each state’s unique geographical, 
linguistic, and cultural diversity. 
 
